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REDD in the Carbon Market: A general equilibrium analysis

Francesco Bosello* Fabio Eboli° Ramiro Parrado° Renato Rosa°’

Abstract
Deforestation is a major source of CO2 emissions, accounting for around 17% of total annual
anthropogenic carbon release. While the costs estimates of reducing deforestation rates
considerably vary depending on model assumptions, it is widely accepted that emissions
reductions from avoided deforestation consist of a relatively low cost mitigation option. Halting
deforestation is therefore not only a major ecological challenge, but also a great opportunity to
cost effectively reduce climate change negative impacts.
In this paper we analyze the impact of introducing avoided deforestation credits into the
European carbon market using a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium model – the
ICES model (Inter-temporal Computable Equilibrium System). Taking into account political
concerns over a possible “flooding” of REDD credits, various limits to the number of REDD
allowances entering the carbon market are considered. Finally, unlike previous studies, we
account for both direct and indirect effects occurring on land and timber markets resulting from
lower deforestation rates.
We conclude that avoided deforestation notably reduces climate change policy costs approximately by 80% with unlimited availbility of REDD credits - and may drastically reduce
carbon prices. Policy makers may, however, effectively control for this imposing limits to
avoided deforestation credits use. Moreover, avoided deforestation has the additional positive
effect of reducing carbon leakage of an unilateral European climate change policy. This is good
news for the EU, but not necessarily for REDD regions. Indeed we show that REDD revenues
are not sufficient to compensate REDD regions for a less leakage-affected and more competitive
EU in international markets. In fact, REDD regions would prefer to free ride on the EU
unilateral mitigation policy.

Keywords: Forestry, Avoided Deforestation, Climate Change, Emission Trading,
General Equilibrium Modelling
JEL Classification: D58, Q23, Q54

*Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, University of Milan, Euromediterranean Center for Climate Change
°Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, University of Venice, Euromediterranean Center for Climate Change
°’ Corresponding author:
Renato Nunes Rosa
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Isola di S. Giorgio Maggiore
30124 Venice
ITALY
renato.nunesrosa@feem.it

This paper is part of the research of the Sustainable Development Programme of the
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

1
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 530 [2010]

1

Introduction

Tropical deforestation is a major source of CO2 emissions and the main cause of
biodiversity loss. According to the 2007 Fourth IPPC report, deforestation accounts for
around 17% of total annual atmospheric carbon release (IPCC 2007). Given the rising
concern of potential dangerous risks accruing from high level of atmospheric
greenhouse gases (GHGs) concentrations, a large number of economic studies have
already analyzed the potential for and costs of emission reduction through avoided
deforestation. Estimates vary considerably depending on modelling assumptions,
however it is widely accepted that avoided deforestation can offer large mitigation
opportunities at a relatively low cost. This result is particularly robust as confirmed by
studies conducted with different methodologies.
Thus for instance, Kindermann et al (2008) comparing the results from three different
global forestry and land-use models show that a carbon price of 100$ per ton of CO2
could abate 2.8-4.7 of Gt of CO2 from deforestation activities during the period 2005–
2030, representing more or less 10% of total 2004 CO2 emissions as reported by IPCC
2007. According to their analysis, the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities
are to be found in Africa, Central and South America and Southeast Asia.
Similar findings come from a branch of literature which “couples” forestry models with
more economic oriented integrated assessment models in the attempt to nest forestry
dynamics into a more realistic representation of the economic system. In this vein
Sohngen and Mendelsohn, (2003) linked a global forestry model with the DICE model
of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and suggest that forestry could cost effectively account
for 30% of total carbon abatement across the century. Tavoni et al. (2007) used the
World Induced Technological Change Hybrid model (WITCH) to analyse the impacts
of introducing forestry mitigation opportunities on the costs of meeting a 550 ppmv CO2
concentration target. According to this last study, forest activities generates policy cost
savings of around 40% that could be used to finance an additional 0.25°C less warming
by the end of the century. Both studies, however, considered not only opportunities
from avoided deforestation but also included afforestation, reforestation and forest
management. More recently, Bosetti et al. (2009) analyzed specifically the role of
avoided deforestation under a more stringent stabilization target (450 ppmv CO2). This
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study explicitly models a potential emission trading market based on national emissions
reduction commitments and allows for the possibility to “bank” emissions allowances.
When REDD generated credits can be sold, forest emissions considerably decrease and
total costs of the stabilization policy are lowered by 10-23%. Or alternatively, REDD
could enable a additional reduction of 20ppmv of CO2 equivalent concentration without
policy costs increase.
The comprehensive Eliasch Review (2008) has investigated the impact of introducing
credits from forestry activities and CDM into the European Union emissions trading
scheme (EU ETS). The study concludes that a 50% supplementarity1 would allow a
30% emissions cut at the same cost of a 20% cut with a 30% supplementarity during
Phase III of the EU ETS. The role of forest credits is substantial: it could lower the costs
of halving global carbon emissions from 1990 levels by up to 50% in 2030 and by up to
40% in 2050.
Finally, Dixon et al. (2008) using a numerical multi-country, two-sector partial
equilibrium model of the global carbon market concluded that international permit price
would be reduced by 45% when, in addition to CDM, unlimited carbon credits from
avoided deforestation are available. Moreover, policy compliance costs decrease by
more than one third. Their analysis assessed the impacts of climate policies in a single
period market ending in 2020 considering a post Kyoto 2012-2020 scenario where
emission reduction targets were based on public announcements.
In this paper we address the role REDD may play in the European carbon market, in the
context of a mitigation policy aiming to reduce EU emissions by 20% respect to 1990 in
2020. We use a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. We not
only discuss the likely implications of REDD for carbon market prices and policy costs
but also examine carbon leakage, distributional aspects resulting from climate policies
or incentives to participate in a carbon trading system when reduction emissions from
avoided deforestation are considered. Unlike previous studies addressing the potential
introduction of REDD credits in carbon markets we account for direct and indirect
effects occurring both on land and timber markets. Reductions in deforestation rates are
endogenously calculated using a carbon market price signal, decreasing both the amount
of land available to agricultural uses and the flow of wood entering timber markets in

1

the proportion of abatement effort that can be met with non-Annex I country credits
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respect to what would occur in a business as usual scenario or a policy not accounting
for REDD credits. While most studies on carbon markets and avoided deforestation do
not take into account this effect, it represents a cost to countries providing REDD
credits and may, therefore, influence incentives to participate in a carbon trading system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents data and modelling framework.
Section 3 discusses results and section 4 concludes.

2

The modelling framework

The modelling tool used for the analysis of the implication of REDD in the global
economy is provided by the recursive-dynamic ICES CGE model based on the core
structure of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database version 6
(Dimaranan, 2006). Its production side is however that of the GTAP-E model (Burniaux
and Truong, 2002). This in order to account for a more satisfactory representation of the
energy and emission sides of economic systems. GTAP-E also includes carbon taxes
and an Emission Trade (ET) module to simulate international carbon market which are
key to our investigation. We updated that, originally restricted to emission reduction
from fossil fuel use, to account for emission reduction from avoided deforestation and
the trading of carbon credits originated. As said, the model is a dynamic recursive one.
However in the present study we use it in a simplified version basically projecting in
just one time step all the system from 2001 (the calibration year) to 2020. The regional
and sectoral detail of the model, its production tree and baseline assumptions are
reported in appendix I.
The role of avoided deforestation has then been introduced through three different
channels.
Firstly, a set of equations computing regional emission reductions from avoided
deforestation in response to different carbon prices have been added to the model.
Parameterization of these equations are derived from the IIASA Cluster model (Gusti et
al. 2008) prepared for the Eliasch (2008) report.
Following Kindermann et al. (2008), we assume that avoided deforestation and the
associated credits come only from the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities
4
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areas: Africa, Central and South America and Southeast Asia. However, according to
the deforestation rates obtained trough IIASA Cluster model (Gusti et al. 2008)) more
than the 94% of total world deforestation activity took place in these areas (2000 data).
We also assume that all these regions have already established institutional and
governmental structures that would allow them to immediately enter the European
trading scheme. Those reduction are then subtracted from the total emissions originated
by the model. The generated credits can be sold in the international carbon market and
accrue national income of the sellers and decrease that of the buyers.
Secondly, changes in deforestation patterns fostered by the possibility to sell REDD
credits into the carbon market affect agricultural, forestry and pasture land use, i.e. the
regional land stocks. Indeed more forest remaining unharvested implies a lower amount
of land available to agricultural and pasture activities. This lower availability is defined
with respect to a baseline land availability under “business as usual deforestation rates”.
Both baseline regional land availability and its mitigation-policy driven change have
been estimated starting from the IIASA cluster model. This provides baseline emissions
from deforestation that we converted to (lost) forest hectares using UN FAO (2006). To
simplify, we assumed that each hectare lost to forest is gained to agriculture/pasture
(and vice versa). Then, baseline land availability is endogenously corrected in response
to (lower) deforestation under different carbon prices.
Thirdly, reduced deforestation resulting from different carbon prices also decreases the
total amount of wood entering timber markets. To account for this fact, we follow a
similar approach to the one described above. A business as usual timber supply is then
endogenously modified accounting for the lower harvesting induced by the possibility
to sell REED credits. The relation between non harvested hectares and timber
production from primary forest (cubic meters) has been estimated coupling data from
FAO (UN FAO 2006) with Brown (2000) reporting information on timber extraction
from primary and forest plantation .
The simulation exercise is performed for year 2020.
Three different scenarios are compared:
The no policy business as usual. This is a 2020 benchmark obtained perturbing the
calibration year equilibrium (2001) in order to replicate regional population and GDP
growth consistent with the A2 IPCC scenarios.
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EU emission reduction policy without REDD: this assumes that the EU implements
unilaterally a 20% emission reduction compared to 1990. At this stage we consider only
one regional aggregate for the EU, thus this exercise is equivalent to one in which,
within the EU, the burden of abatement can be allocated efficiently across sectors and
countries through an EU carbon market.
EU emission reduction with REDD. Same as above, but with the additional possibility
for Sub Saharan Africa (SSA thereafter), Central and South America (LACA thereafter)
and Southeast Asia (EASIA thereafter) to enter the EU ETS selling REDD credits. Note
that it is assumed that these regions can participate to the EU carbon market even
without accepting binding reduction quota, but only on the basis of proven reduction in
“business as usual” deforestation activities. This option has been chosen as it should
provide the highest incentive to REED countries to engage in deforestation actions and
allows us to isolate its role in the policy context.
3

Results

3.1

REDD and overall policy implication

The EU unilateral mitigation policy imposes the region a reduction of 866 million tons
of CO2 originating a price on the carbon market of 46$/t CO2 (Table 1) at a cost for the
EU as a whole of roughly 0.9% of its GDP compared to the baseline2 (Table 2). The
unilateral EU effort originates the well known leakage effect. Commodities produced in
countries with a less stringent climate policy (in our case without a climate policy
indeed) become more competitive as they are not charged with environmental taxes.
They are thus increasingly demanded, and increasingly produced. Consequently
emissions outside the EU also increase. The study highlights a quite strong leakage
(+1.2 % of emissions in the non EU countries) offsetting roughly 45% of European
reductions (see Fig. 1). This however should be interpreted as the most pessimistic

2

These figures are perfectly in line with the existing literature. As a comparison we just quote the 2008

EC staff working documents on the cost of meeting the 20-20-20 EU target which estimate for the EU27
a cost ranging from the 0.54% to the 0.66% of GDP with a price ranging from 30 to 47€/t CO2 (SEC
2008a,b).
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possible outcome as it is assumed that no country outside the EU will put in place any
emission reduction policy. Interestingly, in this context, it is the USA that contributes
more to the world increased emissions, however emerging economies (LACA, FSU,
MDE and China) also represent a significant share.
By opening the EU ETS to REDD credits the price of carbon is expected to drop to 8$/t
CO2 (a reduction of the 83%). Basically the supply of REED credits, without restriction,
could alone meet almost the totality of emission reduction required to the EU.
Accordingly, the concern that an unrestricted use of REDD credits could flood the
carbon market appears justified in this specific context. The EU would buy 6700 $
million of imported pollution right, but “gaining” a drop of GDP costs from the original
1% to the 0.2% compared to the baseline.
The most interesting effect is probably that on leakage: the possibility for the EU to buy
its reduction from REED countries is much less penalizing in term of competitiveness
than unilateral reduction. EU commodities “suffer” less in international markets and
symmetrically the competitive advantage for non EU countries is reduced. Increase in
non EU emissions now offsets just the 12% of EU reduction and GDP gains in the non
EU are lower (see table 2).
This trend applies to REDD countries as well.
On the one hand, SSA, EASIA and LACA increase their GDP in the REED compared
to the no policy baseline scenario. Thus benefits from selling REDD credits to the EU
are larger than their direct and indirect costs. We recall than in our exercise the first are
triggered by lower land available to agriculture/pasture and lower raw wood supply to
the timber sector (see below). On the other hand, all these regions are unambiguously
better off if a carbon market is introduced in Europe without the possibility to use
REDD credits (see 8th and 2nd columns in Table 2). While this may seem counterintuitive, the explanation behind this result is actually straightforward since it is directly
related with carbon leakage. For REDD countries, the EU loss of competitiveness in a
unilateral mitigation action outweighs gains from selling REED, but to a more
competitive EU. This is a typical example of indirect effects - on GDP through
competitiveness - being larger than direct effects - on GDP through revenues from sold
credits -. This is not uncommon especially when these last, as in our case, are small.
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They indeed amount just to 0.08%, 0.21% and 0.09% of GDP for EASIA, SSA and
LACA respectively.
Thus summarizing: a full opening of the ETS market to REDD credits would be in the
EU interest, but not in that of REDD regions. Rephrasing this using the coalition theory
jargon: the participation by REDD regions is profitable, but not internally stable. For
them it would be better to free ride on the EU agreement. Note also that, in our context,
gains from free-riding arise only because of higher competitiveness and not because of
an improved environmental quality brought about by EU emission reductions.
It is worth stressing that this result should be interpreted with care: it is driven by the
economic leakage which is one of the most difficult aspect to measure.
Firstly, it is determined by the shape of the agreement determining it. Larger
participation and the possibility to sell REDD together with other emission reduction
credits may lower its size.
Secondly, it depends on the evolution of the import/export composition in the world
market on its turn influenced by technological factors which are very difficult to capture.
Thirdly, it depends on the substitution possibility between imported and domestic goods,
i.e. Armington elasticities, which can change over time.

3.2

Effects on land and timber sectors.

A critical aspect regarding the use of REDD credits in an international carbon market
concerns its eventual impact on land and agricultural prices on regions selling avoided
deforestation credits. To show the relevance of this effect, Figures 2 and 3 contrast the
change in land and timber prices estimated by our exercise, i.e. considering impacts on
land and timber supply (“modified model” in figures), with those originated by an
exercise in which these are not included (“unmodified model” in figures).
When direct land use effects resulting from reduced deforestation are not modelled, we
observe that land prices are marginally affected when the European carbon market is
opened to this type of credit. In contrast, when these are taken into account and no
restrictions are imposed to the used of REDD credits, land prices increase by 1.1% for
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SSA, 2% for EASIA and 1.4% for LACA with respect to business as usual levels. One
could expect to observe a higher increase in land prices especially considering that the
current policy would reduce deforestation rates in the year 2020 by 22% compared to
business as usual. However in term of agricultural/pasture land this means a lower
availability of just the 0.9% compared to BAU. As a consequence also the effects on
food prices are negligible. A policy requiring more stringent efforts, eventually
involving more partners, would likely affect land prices in these regions on a higher
scale.
We observe a very similar result regarding changes in timber prices. When timber flows
are not directly modelled to take into account land use change impacts, prices remain
almost unaffected. However when these are explicitly modelled, timber prices increase
by 2.6% in LACA, 3.4% in EASIA and 4.7% in SSA.
An interesting case is that of the LACA region: indeed the EU climate policy (with and
without REDD) would decrease land and timber prices below business as usual levels
when direct effects on land and timber are not considered. This is a typical sectoral
recomposition effect: although LACA economies are more competitive when the EU
implements its mitigation policy, (indeed LACA GDP increases and its terms of trade
improve), these gains are concentrated in the raw material and heavy industry sectors
and not in agriculture and forestry whose demand and production fall. When the policyinduced land and timber scarcity are correctly modelled however, their prices increase.

3.3

Restrictions and incentives to selling REDD credits

In this section we analyse the consequences of introducing limits to the use of REDD
credits in the European Trading System. Restriction levels are defined as the maximum
amount of total reduction efforts that can be met by Europe using REDD credits.
Restrictions can be justified to control the carbon price decrease and maintain a
sufficient dynamic stimulus to the development of environmental friendly and energy
saving technologies, but also, in the light of what said, as an incentive to REDD
countries to sell credits and not free ride on the EU mitigation policy.
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Table 1 and 2 present, respectively, the different levels of CO2 prices and policy costs
under various restriction levels. As can be expected, under the EU perspective, both
carbon prices and policy costs increase with restrictions. Limiting the use of REDD
credits therefore consists of an effective option to preventing an eventual flooding of
“cheap” credits into the European carbon market and to keeping carbon prices high
enough to stimulate investments in greener technologies, however at the expenses of
higher policy costs.
A good compromise between these two conflicting instances could be represented by a
30% restriction to REDD credits: the carbon price would be reduced by approximately
32%, against the 83% reduction when no limits to these type of credits are imposed; at
the same time the policy cost measured in terms of GDP loss compared to the baseline
equals 0.6%, against 1% in the case where no REDD credits are allowed to enter the
ETS. The carbon leakage would remain quite high though, still offsetting 35% of
European reductions.
Under the point of view of the REDD regions, first of all it can be noticed that revenues
from selling credits are not linear with restrictions (Figure 4). They are determined by
the elasticity along the supply curves of REDD credits. Thus they typically follow a bell
shaped trend. Thus the largest revenues for SSA and LACA are experienced when
restrictions approximately reach the 50%, whereas for EASIA when they are no larger
than the 10%.
However, it is also clear that, except from the case of SSA when the use of REDD
credits is limited to 5-10%, no restriction is able to make REDD regions better off
participating to the market, than not participating and having the EU mitigating with
unilateral action.
It is thus confirmed that in our specific exercise indirect effects on competitiveness
overcompensate direct REDD revenues from selling credits.
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Table 1. CO2 Price

CO2 Price $/t
% reduction wrt full
access to REDD
credits use

Access to REDD credits in the ETS market (100% = full)
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
50% 100%
43
40
38
35
33
31
23
8

0%
46

-6%

-12%

-17%

-22%

-27%

-32%

-50%

-83%

Table 2. GDP: % changes w.r.t BAU

USA

0,012

ETS
REDD
5%
Limit
0,012

Europe

-0,952

-0,895

-0,839

-0,733

-0,635

-0,463

-0,160

FSU

0,420

0,387

0,355

0,297

0,246

0,170

0,103

KOSAU

0,079

0,075

0,071

0,064

0,056

0,044

0,023

CAJANZ

0,050

0,048

0,045

0,040

0,035

0,027

0,010

NAF

0,318

0,294

0,270

0,227

0,188

0,129

0,079

MDE

0,184

0,171

0,158

0,134

0,112

0,078

0,039

SSA

0,172

0,174

0,174

0,169

0,158

0,130

0,058

SASIA

0,054

0,051

0,048

0,042

0,037

0,027

0,008

CHINA

0,041

0,038

0,035

0,031

0,026

0,019

0,008

EASIA

0,047

0,044

0,041

0,035

0,030

0,021

0,006

LACA

0,064

0,062

0,061

0,057

0,053

0,043

0,023

ETS w/o
REDD

ETS
REDD
10%
Limit
0,011

ETS
REDD
20%
Limit
0,009

ETS
REDD
30%
Limit
0,008

ETS
REDD
50%
Limit
0,006

ETS
unlimited
REDD
0,003

Note: in bold REDD regions
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Figure 1. Carbon Leakage (in % of European emission reductions)
50%

45,36%

43,70%

45%

42,03%
38,72%

40%

35,42%

35%
28,82%

30%
25%
20%

12,18%

15%
10%
5%
0%
ETS w/o REDD Credits

ETS REDD 5% Limit

ETS REDD 10% Limit

ETS REDD 30% Limit

ETS REDD 50% Limit

ETS unlimited REDD

ETS REDD 20% Limit

Figure 2. Land Price: % Changes w.r.t BAU
3%

2%

1%

0%
SSA

EASIA

LACA

-1%
Modified model

Unmodified model

Figure 3. Timber Price: % Changes w.r.t BAU
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
SSA

EASIA

LACA

-1%
Modified model

Unmodified model
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Figure 4. REDD credits revenues
12000
10000

$ Million

8000
6000
4000
2000
0
0%

10%

20%

30%

SSA

40%

50%

EASIA

60%

LACA

70%

80%

90%

100%

Total

Note: 100% means no restriction to REDD credits use, 0% means no possibility to use REDD credits

4

Conclusions

In this paper we addressed the role REDD may play in the European carbon market
assuming that the EU reduces its CO2 emissions by 20% with respect to 1990 levels in
year 2020. We used a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and,
differently from previous studies, we account for both direct and indirect effects
occurring on land and timber markets resulting from lower deforestation rates. These,
endogenously driven by carbon price signals, then trigger changes in land available to
agricultural/pasture activities and in raw timber supply to the wood industry according
to estimated functions which are implemented into the model.
Consistently with previous works, we observed that including emissions reductions
from avoided deforestation generates considerable policy cost savings peaking up to
80% when no restriction to REDD credit use is imposed. We also confirmed that an
unlimited availability of REDD credits could “flood” the market, drastically reduce
carbon prices (by 83%), and therefore possibly lower the incentive to develop energy
and carbon saving technologies. This can be, however, effectively controlled limiting
the access to avoided deforestation permits. For instance, a 30% restriction to REDD
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credit use would anyway reduce the policy cost by 34%, but keeping carbon price at the
acceptably high level of 31$/t CO2.
Interestingly enough, REDD has the additional benefit of reducing carbon leakage
effects resulting from the introduction of the EU climate change policy. While leakage
amounts for almost 45% of european reductions under a European trading system
excluding REDD, this number decreases to 12% when unlimited access to REDD credit
is allowed. The trend in carbon leakage is “mirrored” by that of the economic leakage.
Each reduction in the first is coupled with a lower decrease in the competitiveness of
EU commodities in international markets. This has important policy implications.
Allowing REDD surely entails gain for the EU. This is not necesarily so for REDD
regions though. They benefit from the inflow of REDD revenues, but they also face a
more competitive EU in the trade arena. Indeed, we showed that the second effect
prevails on the first. In particular, GDP in REDD regions is higher when they sell
avoided deforestation credits to the EU compared with a no EU policy scenario. Thus
benefits from avoided deforestation are higher than the opportunity costs represented by
a lower land available to agriculture and pasture activities and by a lower timber supply
to the wood industry. Nonetheless, when EASIA, SSA and LACA sell credits to the EU
their GDP is lower compared to the case in which the EU implements unilaterally its
mitigation policy. In other words, REDD regions would find it preferable to free ride on
the EU mitigation policy. Note that in this analysis we are not taking into account the
environmentl benefits triggered by EU emission reductions, but just those arising from
international trade effects. If those were included, the free riding incentive would be
even stronger. We also showed that, by and large, no restriction to REDD credit use can
revert this outcome.
Finally, the use of REDD credits can effectively reduce de-forestation activities (by
22% in 2020 without restriction) and induce only moderate increases on land and timber
prices in REDD regions (in a range of the 1%- 2% the first and of the 2.6% - 4.7% the
second).
Many developments are foreseen for the present work.
Firstly, due to the crucial role played by the leakage effect, we would like to test the
robustness of our results either to different parameterization of the Armington
elasticities which drives the substitutability between domestic and imported
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commodities (even though a plausible trend is that of an increase in this substitutability
and accordingly that of a stronger leakage) or to a different design of the mitigation
agreement. In this last respect an enlarged participation - for instance including all
developed regions – will decrease the leakage and possibly reduce the incentive to free
ride.
Secondly we would like to improve the dynamic nature of the whole exercise. At
present we are using a recursive-dynamic model just projecting the whole system in one
jump to 2020. In a next work we would use one year time-steps to implement more
detailed time specific curves for de-forestation activities.
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Annex I: ICES technical appendix

ICES is a recursive-dynamic CGE model for the world economy.
The regional and sectoral detail of the model used for this study are represented in Table
A1.
Table A1. Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the ICES model
USA:
EUX
FSU:
KOSAU:
CAJANZ:
NAF:
MDE:
SSA:
SASIA:
CHINA:
EASIA:
LACA:

Regions
United States
EU including
Former Soviet Union
Korea, S. Africa, Australia
Canada, Japan, New Zealand
North Africa
Middle East
Sub Saharan Africa
India and South Asia
China
East Asia
Latin and Central America

Rice
Wheat
Other Cereal
Vegetable Fruits
Animals
Forestry
Fishing
Coal
Oil
Gas
Oil Products
Electricity

Sectors
Water
Energy Intensive industries
Other industries
Market Services
Non-Market Services

ICES solves recursively a sequence of static equilibria linked by endogenous investment
determining the growth of capital stock from 2001 to 2050. For the present study the
model is run in a simplified version where endogenous investment decision drives
2001-2020 growth in just one time leap.
GDP growth rates for the region modelled replicate those of the IPCC A2 scenario and
are reported in table A2.
Table A2. GDP growth rates for the BAU (% 2001-2020)
Region
USA
Med_Europe
North_Europe
East_Europe
FSU
KOSAU
CAJANZ
NAF
MDE
SSA
SASIA
CHINA
EASIA
LACA

GDP growth
52.7
35.3
33.3
103.0
157.6
47.5
33.2
165.0
146.2
199.6
225.4
275.6
172.3
106.9
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Assumptions on the evolution of population (taken from UNPD, 2008), energy
efficiency (taken from Bosetti et. al., 2006), GHG emission and of major fossil fuel
prices (based on EIA, 2007 and EIA, 2009) are also incorporated and reported in Table
A3.
Table A3. Major exogenous variables growth rates for the BAU (% 2001-2020)
Region

Population

USA
Med_Europe
North_Europe
East_Europe
FSU
KOSAU
CAJANZ
NAF
MDE
SSA
SASIA
CHINA
EASIA
LACA

15.6
0.5
0.1
-4.6
-3.2
9.4
-0.4
31.7
37.6
46.9
29.9
12.3
24.3
26.4

Energy
efficiency
12.8
17.1
17.1
40.4
36.6
27.5
17.3
26.8
26.8
22.0
44.7
47.5
43.5
23.5

CO2

Fuel

21.6
1.7
1.8
28.6
74.0
10.1
2.2
65.5
72.8
129.2
115.5
145.7
75.3
36.4

Price

Coal
Oil
Gas
Oil Products

16
74
28
40

Industries are modelled through a representative firm, minimizing costs while taking
prices as given. In turn, output prices are given by average production costs. The
production functions are specified via a series of nested CES functions. Domestic and
foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes, according to the so-called “Armington”
assumption. The production tree is reported in Figure A1.
Figure A1. Nested tree structure for industrial production processes of the ICES model
Output
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A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value
of national primary factors (natural resources, land, labour, capital, see Figure A2).
Capital and labour are perfectly mobile domestically but immobile internationally. Land
and natural resources, on the other hand, are industry-specific.
This income is used to finance three classes of expenditure: aggregate household
consumption, public consumption and savings. The expenditure shares are generally
fixed, which amounts to saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas
specification.
Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items, again according
to a Cobb-Douglas specification. However, almost all expenditure is actually
concentrated in one specific industry: Non-market Services.
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative composite Armington
aggregates. However, the functional specification used at this level is the Constant
Difference in Elasticities form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for
possible differences in income elasticities for the various consumption goods.
Investment is internationally mobile: savings from all regions are pooled and then
investment is allocated so as to achieve equality of expected rates of return to capital.
In this way, savings and investments are equalized at the world, but not at the regional
level. Because of accounting identities, any financial imbalance mirrors a trade deficit
or surplus in each region.
Figure A2. Nested tree structure for final demand of the ICES model
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